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THE CHARTER AND ANGLOPHONE 
LEGAL THEORY 
Richard F. Devlin* 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
has generated not only new terrain over which 
discursive positions are mobilized, but it has 
catalysed theoretical reflection about law, society, 
state, and the self. Examining the implications of 
the Charter for Anglophone legal theory, the 
author conducts both a qualitative and quantita­
tive survey ofjurisprudential work on the Charter 
and concludes that the Charter's impact on legal 
theory has been significant. The Charter has 
prompted expansion of the range of interdisciplin­
ary influences, contextualized theoretical reflec­
tion, and made jurisprudence more engaged with 
and relevant to Canadian social life. The Charter 
also has facilitated a fragmentation or "jurispru­
dential pluralism, " reflective of underlying shifts 
in Canadian political discourse. The Charter's 
most significant impact, however, will have been 
its impetus to transform theoretical engagement 
with the law in directions far removed from the 
stale confines of analytical positivism. 
Non seulement la Charte canadienne des droiis et 
libertes a-t-elle cree un terrain nouveau OU Les 
positions discursives se mobilisent, mais elle 
catalyse egalement la reflexion theorique sur le 
droit, la societe, l'Etat et le soi. L'auteur examine 
les implications de la Charte pour la theorie 
juridique anglophone. Au terme d'une enquete 
qualitative et quantitative des travaux jurispru­
dentiels en la matiere, ii conclut que la Charte 
exerce une influence determinante sur la doctrine. 
La Charte a contribue a elargir considerablement 
la portee des influences interdisciplinaires, a 
contextualiser la reflexion theorique et a rehaus­
ser la pertinence de la jurisprudence en regard de 
la vie sociale canadienne. La Charte a egalement 
facilite une certaine fragmentation du « pluralisme 
jurisprudentiel », a ['image des changements sous­
jacents du discours politique canadien. L'impact 
majeur de la Charte, cependant, reside dans 
L'incitation au changement qu'elle exerce sur 
/'engagement theorique avec la Loi, bien au-dela 
des perspectives etriquees du positivisme analy­
tique. 
• Associate Professor, Dalhousie Law School, Visiting Professor, McGill Law School ( 1995-
1996). This paper originally was commissioned as part of the Centre for Constitutional 
Studies' project on the impact of the Charter. The papers in that research project have since 
been collected in Charting the Consequences: The Impact of the Charter on Canadian Law 
and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) edited by D. Schneiderman and 
K. Sutherland. Due to a number of circumstances (mostly because of delay), this paper does 
not appear in the collection, but is being published separately. Special thanks to Alexandra 
Dobrowolsky, Helene Lajeunesse, Kevin Peterson, Dianne Pothier, and an anonymous 
reviewer for their assistance in helping me complete this essay. The review is current to 
December 1995. 
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Constitutional litigation ought not to be seen as a barren exercise of statutory interpretation 
.... The legal community must assist the courts by working to develop a theoretical 
framework of constitutional principles. 
1... 
Brian Dickson C.J. 1 
The process of the production of modern legal systems is part of an ongoing production of 
social life. A country's jurisprudence is a specific representation of a socially constructed 
order of things - a construction that is not the prerogative of ruling classes or of men, but 
which is struggled for, negotiiited, compromised and redirected every step of the way. 
V. Kerruish2 
I. ON METHOD - JURISPRUDENTOLOGY 
It is a commonplace for academics to convince themselves of the necessity 
of writing a paper and, then, when they come to work on it sometime later, to 
discover that they are unclear both as to what they might want to say and, even 
more frustratingly, how they might begin to embark on the process of 
discovering what they want to say. This sense of paralysis when it comes to 
method, while common among scholars from many disciplines, is I think 
particularly acute for legal academics for two interconnected reasons. First, as 
the Arthurs Report in its (in)famous diagrammatic way revealed, the vast 
majority of legal scholarship in Canada has tended to be in the genre of black 
letter, doctrinal exposition. 3 As a result, while such an approach clearly involves 
a method, more often than not such a method is simply assumed to be the right 
way of going about things and, therefore, requiring of no further reflection. 
Secondly, relative to most other academic disciplines, common law legal 
scholars historically have had short periods of graduate legal training and, 
therefore, have had little opportunity to consider questions of method. We have 
tended to be a ')ust do it" sort of discipline. While having certain advantages (at 
least in terms of efficiency) such an approach tends to leave us high and dry 
when we attempt to do something different. 
Such was my own sense when I decided to write an essay on the relationship 
between (he Charter and Canadian jurisprudence. In theory, it seemed like a 
great idea, but executing such a practice proved to be quite daunting. Thus, the 
first step of the process was to consider how one could go about identifying and 
2 
3 
"An Address to the Mid-Winter Meeting of the Canadian Bar Association" Edmonton 
(2 February 1985) 13-19. 
V.  Kerruish, Jurisprudence as Ideology (New York: Routledge, 1991) at 196. 
Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and Research Council of Canada 
(Ottawa: Research Council of Canada, 1983) c. 5. 
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evaluating the dynamic between legal theory and the Charter. The solution that 
I have come up with can be captured in a fancy new term that describes a fairly 
simple idea: 'jurisprudentology." An "-ology" is a short hand way of saying "the 
study of something," in the sense of sociology, archaeology or theology. 
Jurisprudentology is the study of jurisprudence and, therefore, assumes that there 
is in fact a practice called jurisprudence. Consequently, there is a distinction to 
be drawn between doing jurisprudence and thinking about jurisprudence. 
Phrased somewhat more philosophically, this can be considered analogous to the 
distinction between "theory" and "metatheory." Thus, this essay is an attempt to 
think about legal theory. 4 
But before we can get to jurisprudentology, it will probably be helpful to say 
a little more about the term "jurisprudence," as well as the nomination "legal 
theory" which, as the reader will have noticed, I use interchangeably. 
II. ON THE PARAMETERS OF LEGAL THEORY 
In this section, I want to make a few preliminary comments about the nature, 
scope, and methods of legal theory. However, it is to be noted that what follows 
4 
1997 
It is to be noted, however, that although I think I might have created a neologism, I am 
certainly not claiming to be the first to think about jurisprudence. Jurisprudentology is 
frequently practised, both explicitly and implicitly. For example, on the explicit level, 
there are reviews by S. Boyd & E. Sheehy on feminist legal theory ["Feminist 
Perspectives on Law: .Canadian Theory and Practice" ( 1986) 2 C.J.W.L. 1], F. 
DeCoste's tentative ruminations on the politics of legal theory ['Taking a Stand: Theory 
in the Canadian Legal Academy" (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 941], RA. MacDonald's early 
assessment of Charter jurisprudence ["Postscript and Prelude - the Jurisprudence of 
the Charter: Eight theses" (1982) 4 S.C.L.R. 321] and M. Gold's reflections on 
constitutional scholarship ["Constitutional Scholarship in Canada" ( 1985) 23 Osgoode 
Hall L. J. 495; M. Gold, "Moral and Political Theories in Equality Rights Adjudication" 
in J. Weiler & R: Elliot, eds., Litigating the Values of a Nation: Tlie Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 85]. See also R. Shiner, 
"Jurisprudence: Ideology or Analysis?" (1993) 8 Can. J. Law & Soc. 205 and R. Case, 
"Theorizing about Law" (1993) 6 Can. J. Law & Jur. 1 13. 
On the implicit level, to the extent that much legal theory critically engages in 
debate with other legal theories, frequently by demanding that they be more self­
reflective about their own assumptions and aspirations, it is also an exercise in 
jurisprudentology. See, for example, J. Bakan, "Constitutional Interpretation and Social 
Change: You Can't Always Get What You Want (Or What You Need)" in R. Devlin, 
ed., Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1991) at 
445; B. Etherington, "An Assessment of Judicial Review of Labour Laws Under the 
Charter: Of Realists, Romantics, and Pragmatists" (1992) 24 Ottawa L. Rev. 685; or 
D. Herman, "The Good, the Bad, and the Smugly: Perspectives on the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms" (1994) 14 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 589. 
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should not be conceived of as an attempt to provide a single comprehensive 
definition of legal theory for such closure, even if it were possible, would be 
undesirable in that it would attempt to impose parameters on a practice that is 
always in the process of becoming. 
Jurisprudence, drawing on its latin origins, can be understood as wisdom 
about law.5 More specifically, and supplementing in a crucially important way 
Catharine Mac Kinnon' s insight, 6 jurisprudence is theory about the relationship 
· between law, life, and death. Theory is one technique, one approach, by which 
we can seek to achieve wisdom. More precisely, by theory I mean the active 
process (theorizing) of self-consciously making explicit and reflectively 
interrogating: a) the underlying presumptions; b) the methodological 
assumptions; c) the definitional boundaries; d) the procedural norms; e) the 
criteria for validity; and f) the preferred justifications for any or all of these in 
relation to a social or intellectual phenomenon. 
If one raises an explicitly jurisprudential point, a common reaction is what 
might be described as theory phobia, a response that may reflect either a concern 
by another as to their own inability to think on the theoretical level or, 
alternatively, a rolling of the eyes in the -expectation of unintelligible 
abstractionism that has little practical relevance. The first response sometimes 
engenders disengagement and silence, the second disparagement and even 
hostility. While theory can suffer from the vices of intellectual elitism and naval 
gazing ( a.k.a. theoreticism), it need not necessarily do so. A great deal of the 
· problem, I think, depends upon what we mean by abstraction. If it is taken to 
mean obscurity, then it seems to me that scepticism is warranted. If, however, 
abstraction is understood as simply the ability to stand back from the minutiae 
of an intellectual or social phenomenon - law, for example - in order to be 
able to develop some reflective perspective on that phenomenon, then I think 
that the scepticism is unwarranted. 
Moreover, it is important not to confuse abstraction with decontextualism, 
that is, the process whereby one attempts to isolate phenomena from their 
(in)formative environment in order to attain a clearer, or at least less 
6 
It can of course be understood in other ways. Frequently, the collective case law of a 
jurisdiction is described as jurisprudence. As will become clear, this is not the sense in 
which I propose to use the word, though clearly every case. is premised upon 
jurisprudential assumptions. 
C. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of The State (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1989) at 237. 
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contaminated, understanding of the nature of the phenomenon. While 
decontextualization can be one theoretical strategy, so too can contextualism, the 
process of locating phenomena in their relational affinity to other influential 
forces. For example, if we understand law as a social phenomenon, a 
decontextualist theory may seek to consider it as distinct from other factors such 
as history, politics or sociology as, for example, in Kelsen's pure theory of law.7 
On the other hand, it is possible to adopt a contextual approach to law to argue 
that law can only be understood in its relationship to the class relations of a 
society or, in Marxist terms, through the grid of historical materialism. 8 
Similarly, feminist method suggests that jurisprudence must be attentive to the 
specificities of women's conditions. 9 In other words, certain forms of theory do 
factor in the relationship between the general and the particular, the abstract and 
the concrete. 
Furthermore, even if one wants to retain a healthy scepticism about the utility 
of theory, it is to my mind at the very minimum a necessary evil. Because there 
is no such thing as presuppositionless thought or practice, there is always a need 
for reflection on the significance of stances adopted, be they intellectual or 
practical. To borrow a metaphor from Alison Young, forms of legal analysis that 
are dismissive of theory find themselves "in the middle of an uncharted 
theoretical ocean." 10 A self-conscious legal analysis is a reflective mode of 
analysis, one that is willing to interrogate its own assumptions, orientation and 
practices. 
In sum, in this essay I want to invoke an enlarged or expansive conception 
of legal theory, one that recognizes jurisprudence as a multi-dimensional and 
multi-tiered interrogative process in the pursuit of a greater understanding of the 
nature and functions of law, which itself must be understood as a complex, 
controversial, and problematic phenomenon. This emphasis on the interrogative 
dimension is important because it emphasizes that in theory the process of 
questioning is just as important as the results attained. And the sort of questions 
that are asked might include: What is the nature of law? What sort of roles or 






H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). 
J. Fudge, ''Marx's Theory of History and a Marxist Analysis of Law" in Devlin, supra 
note 4 at 151; M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in 
Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Thompson, 1994) at 353, 395-97, 425. 
M. Eberts et al., The Case for Women's Equality: The Federation of Women Teachers' 
Associations of Ontario and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: 
FWTAO, 1991). 
A. Young, Femininity in Dissent (New York: Routledge, 1990) at 156. 
Revue d'etudes constitutionnelles 
24 Richard F. Devlin 
society? How does law fulfill those functions? How important is law in a 
society? Which perspectives, overtly or covertly, inform legal institutions, rules 
or procedures? 
However, an expansive conception of legal theory should not be mistaken for 
the claim that we are all jurisprudes now. While I do not want to repeat the 
d�:mgers of turf patrolling inherent in a thesis such as The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined, 11 to conceive of all legal scholarship as of 
jurisprudential significance would result in an analytically unhelpful over­
inflation. In this sense, it may be easier to suggest what is not within the realm 
of legal theory: classical, formalistic, and expository doctrinal analysis that sees 
its task as being exclusively the systematic reorganization of case law into some 
sort of cohesive structure, designed in the main for the benefit of a busy 
practising bar.12 Thus, a desire for explanation rather than mere description is a 
necessary, if insufficient, benchmark for inclusion in the realm of jurisprudence. 
By way of example, my expansive definition of legal theory might encompass 
Cooper Stephenson's. Charter Damages Claims13 and Fitzgerald's 
Understanding Charter Remedies: A Practitioner's Guide14 but not Hogg's 
Constitutional Law of Canada15 or Finkelstein and Rogers' Charter Issues in 
Civil Cases. 16 And this is no paltry exclusion for doctrinal exegesis is still the 
preferred domain of many legal scholars as is evidenced, for example, by the 
seventy-eight page bibliography in Beaudoin and Ratushny's The Canadian 








J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (New York: Noonday Press, 
1965). 
This is not intended as a critique of this form of scholarship, for undoubtedly such work 
serves valuable purposes. My point is simply that this type of scholarship is not a form 
of jurisprudence, although to my mind all scholarship is premised upon certain 
jurisprudential assumptions. As Northrop has argued: 
To be sure, there are lawyers judges and even law professors who tell us that 
they have no legal philosophy. In law, as in other things, we shall find that the 
only difference between a person without a philosophy and someone with a 
philosophy is that the latter knows what his [sic] philosophy is. 
See F. Northrop, The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience (Toronto: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1959) at 6. 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1990). 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1994). 
P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carsw'ell, 1992). 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1988). 
3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1989). 
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Finally, it should be acknowledged at the outset that in order to render the 
project manageable, there are at least three limitations that significantly 
circumscribe the scope and ambitions of this essay. First, there is no attempt to 
provide a comparative or longitudinal analysis of the development of Canadian 
constitutional theory. 18 Second, the focus is primarily on legal academics who 
write in relation to the Charter and, therefore, I have tended to marginalize the 
important contributions of scholars from other disciplines. Third, and most 
problematically, due to my own inability to read French, I have concentrated on 
anglophone scholars. 
Having outlined some caveats and methodological points, I am now in a 
position to begin to analyze the relationship between the Charter and the recent 
developments of Anglophone legal theory in Canada. Two modes of analysis are 
adopted. First, I develop a somewhat cursory quantitative review of Canadian 
legal scholarship to assess the amount of Charter-oriented legal theory being 
produced in Canada. Second, and more significantly, I pursue a qualitative 
evaluation of the types of Charter analysis and their jurisprudential orientation. 
To achieve this latter task I propose to borrow - or perhaps more accurately to 
hijack - and modify a structure of analysis, a taxonomy even, first articulated 
over twenty years ago by Bill Twining in an article entitled "Some Jobs for 
Jurisprudence" and, subsequently, reworked on several occasions since then. 19 
Twining argues that there are at least five functions20 or tasks for jurisprudence 





But see, for example, Gold, supra note 4 at 495, and R. Yalden, "Liberalism and 
Canadian Constitutional Law: Tensions in an Evolving Vision of Liberty" (1988) 47 
U.T. Fae. L. Rev. 132. 
W. Twining, "Some Jobs for Jurisprudence" (1974) 1 Brit. J. Law & Soc. 149; 
"Evidence and Legal Theory" in W. Twining, ed., Legal Theory and Common Law 
(New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986) at 62; W. Twining & N. MacCormick, "Theory in 
the Law Curriculum" ibid. at 238. There are, of course, other structures available for 
analyzing legal theory. However, most of these adopt a "schools of thought" 
methodology. For the purposes of this paper, I find Twining' s approach more helpful 
in that it allows for a discussion of the forms of jurisprudence as well as the substance 
somewhat more readily than the schools of thought approach. Having said this, I 
acknowledge that every analytical structure is contingent and that some readers may not 
agree with every categorization that ensues. What is offered is a modest attempt to make 
sense of an enormous and rapidly expanding literature. 
I realize that the very mention of the term "function" may ring alarm bells for some 
readers. There is no suggestion in this paper that these are the only functions of legal 
theory or that such approaches are structurally predetermined by some systemic 
imperative. The word is used in the spirit of much of this · paper, in a fairly 
straightforward way, as simply a cognate for ''job," rather than as a term of theoretical 
art. 
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of high theory; the development of theories of the middle order and working 
theories; and a synthesizing function.21 To these I will add a sixth task for 
jurisprudence: an ideological function. 
I l l .  A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
On a quantitative level, legal theoretical scholarship seems to have 
experienced a significant growth over the last decade or so. First, there have been 
a relatively large number of monographs focusing either exclusively or primarily 
on the Charter published in the last ten years.22 There have been at least an 




See "Some Jobs for Jurisprudence," supra note 1 9  at 1 60; also see "Evidence and Legal 
Theory," supra note 19 at 64. 
D. Beatty, Putting the Charter to Work: Designing a Constitutional Labour Code 
(Kingston: McGill Queen's University Press, 1987); D. Beatty, The Canadian 
Production of Constitutional Review: Talking Heads and the Supremes (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1 990); D. Beatty, Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1 995); W. Bogart, Courts and Country: The Limits of 
Litigation and the Social and Political Life of Canada (Toronto: Oxford University 
Press, 1 994); K. Cooper Stevenson, supra note 13; M. Eberts et al., supra note 9; 
Fitzgerald, supra note 14; D. Gibson, The Law of the Charter: General Principles, 
(Calgary: Carswell, 1 986); D. Gibson, The Law of the Charter: Equality Rights 
(Calgary: Carswell, 1990); D. Herman, Rights of Passage: Struggles for Lesbian and 
Gay Legal Equality (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1 994); A. Hutchinson, 
Waiting For CoraJ- A Critique of Law and Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1995); Mandel, supra note 8; M. Manning, Rights, Freedoms and the Courts: A 
Practical Analysis of the Constitution Act, 1982 (Toronto: Emond-Montgomery, 1983); 
P. Monahan, Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the Supreme 
Court of Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1 99 1 ); L. Trakman, Reasoning With the 
Charter (Toronto: Carswell, 1992); J. Webber, Reimagining Canada: Language, 
Culture, Community and the Canadian Constitution (Montreal: McGill University 
Press, 1994). B. Strayer, The Canadian Constitution and the Courts: The Function and 
Scope of Judicial Review, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1 988) might also be added 
given the incorporation of Charter issues. 
J. Bakan & D. Schneiderman, eds., Social Justice and the Constitution: Perspectives 
on a Social Union for Canada (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992); A. Bayefsky 
& M. Eberts, eds., Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(Agincourt: Carswell, 1985); C. Beckton & W. MacKay, eds., The Courts and the 
Charter (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1 985); G. Beaudoin, ed., Charter Cases 
1986-1987 (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1 987); G. Beaudoin, ed., Your Clients and the 
Charter: Liberty and Equality (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1987); G. Beaudoin, ed., As 
the Charter Evolves (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1989); G. Beaudoin, ed., The Charter: 
Ten Years Later (Cowansville: Yvon Blais, . 1992); Beaudoin & Ratushney, supra note 
17; C. Boyle et al., Charterwatch: Reflections on Equality (Toronto: Carswell, 1986); 
P. Bryden et al., eds., Protecting Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: University of Toronto 
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emphasis. Moreover, several new journals have surfaced some which are 
explicitly jurisprudential, 25 others of which are heavily influenced by legal 
theoretical concerns. 26 Finally, other new journals have sprung up with a heavy 
focus on Charter analysis. 27 
To this extent, it can be said there is at least some parallel between growth 
of jurisprudential analysis and Charter scholarship. However, on a qualitative 
level it would seem impossible to draw any causal connection between the 
growth of legal theory and Charter talk. 
First, a review of a journal such as Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence suggests that, in fact, the Charter has had relatively little impact. 
Despite special issues on collective rights, equality rights and law and sexuality, 
the preference seems to be for quite positivistic and highly abstracted analyses 
very much · in the oxonian tradition. Particular favourites seem to include 
Dworkin, Finnis, Hart, Rawls and Raz.28 Similarly, the interdisciplinary 







Press, 1994 ); C.I.A.J.·, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Cowansville: 
Yvon Blais, 1983); Canadian Human Rights Foundation, ed., Multiculturalism and the 
Charter: A Legal Perspective (Toronto: Carswell, 1987); K. Mahoney & S. Martin, 
eds., Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto; Carswell, 1987); D. Schneiderman, ed., 
Freedom of Expression and the Charter (Calgary: Thompson, 1991); R. Sharpe, ed., 
Charter Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths 1987); L. Smith, et al., Righting the 
Balance: Canada 's New Equality Rights (Saskatoon: C.H.R.R., 1986); K. Swinton, ed., 
Competing Constitutional Visions: The Meech Lake Accord (Toronto: Carswell, 1988); 
W. Tarnopolsky & G. Beaudoin, The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A 
Commentary (Toronto: Carswell, 1982); Weiler & Elliot, supra note 4. 
(1983) 61 ·can. Bar Rev.; Charter Edition (1982) 16 U.B.C. L. Rev.; The New 
Constitution and the Charter: Background, Analysis and Commentary (1982) 8 Queen's 
L. J. 7; Labour Law and The Charter (1988) 13 Queen's L. J.; The Loss of Innocence: 
Coming to Terms with the Charter ( 1989) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 447; E. Belobaba & E. 
Gertner, eds., The New Constitution and the Charter of Rights: Fundamental Issues and 
Strategies (1982) 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev.; The Charter: Initial Experience, Emerging Issues, 
Future Challenges (1983) 13 Man. L. J. 427; Critical Perspectives on the Constitution 
(1982) 4 Socialist Studies; B. Strayer, Life Under the Canadian Charter: Adjusting the 
Balance Between Legislatures and Courts (1988) Public Law 347. 
See, for example, Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence. 
See, for example, Canadian Journal of Law & Society and the Journal of Human 
Justice. See also the Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, which was first 
published in 1 985, the year the equality provisions came into force. 
See, for example, Canadian Human Rights Yearbook, Constitutional Forum, National 
Journal of Constitutional Law and the Review of Constitutional Studies. 
It is to be noted that in 1995, it added a new subtitle: An International Journal of Legal 
Thought. 
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hospitable to Charter issues, have been quite wide ranging in their 
jurisprudential coverage. Moreover, the Charter seems to have had little impact 
on the scholarship of some of Canada's most established jurists, for example, 
Professors Weinrib and Trebilcock. 
However, it would be a mistake to underestimate the significance of the 
Charter. The Review of Constitutional Studies and the National Journal of 
Constitutional Law, for example, have published a significant number of articles 
that manifest a subtle (and quite readable) blend of theory and doctrine. 
Moreover, conventional law reviews have devoted a great deal of space to 
literally hundreds of fairly reflective articles on the Charter. Thus, one pattern 
that seems to be emerging is that although Charter-oriented legal theory has not 
(thankfully) occupied the field of the explicitly theoretical journals, it has had a 
significant impact on the broad spectrum of legal journals. Further, leading 
jurists have been unable to resist the allure of the Charter, for example, Bill 
Conklin29 and J.C. Smith.30 Moreover, it might also be suggested that while the 
scholarship of many traditional jurists tends to begin with conceptualism and 
then, perhaps, to work its way down to the practical concerns of law, others 
(perhaps of a younger generation) begin their scholarship with pressing and 
immediate issues and through a process of .reflection and argument work their 
way up to theory.31 In this light, rather than suggesting that the Charter has 
caused a growth in legal theory, it can be understood as a terrain of discursive 
practice that serves as both a forum and catalyst for legal theoretical reflection. 
IV. A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Quantitative analyses, while helpful, can only provide a very limited 
snapshot of the potential relationship between the Charter and anglophone legal 
theory. What is required is a more qualitative analysis, one that is able to map 
the contours of the jurisprudential terrain. As mentioned earlier, a slightly 




W. Conklin, Images of a Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989). 
J.C. Smith, The Neurotic Foundations of Social Order: Psychoanalytic Roots of 
Patriarchy (New York: New York University Press, 1990). 
See, for example, M. Jackman, "The· Protection of Welfare Rights under the Charter" 
(1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 257; L. Phillips, & M. Young, "Sex, Tax and the Charter: A 
Review of Thibaudeau v. Canada" ( 1994) 2 Rev. Const. Studies 221. Other examples 
which I shall return to later in the text might include feminist reflections on the 
significance of s. 15 and arguments by some First Nations scholars on the dangers of 
the rights orientation of the Charter. 
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A. Constructing Intellectual History 
Twining, while acknowledging that it is not a task that is unique to legal 
theory, argues that the pursuit of intellectual history entails "the systematic study 
and criticism of the heritage of legal thought and critical study of the work of 
individual thinkers. "32 While there has been some work by Canadian legal 
theorists in developing this sort of work,33 not surprisingly the Charter has had 
little influence given its recent vintage. The closest we come is perhaps some 
scholarship in symposia for retiring Supreme Court judges such as DicksonC.J.34 
and Wilson J. 35 or general overviews of the various stances commentators have 
taken in relation to the Charter. 36 
B. Conduit Function 
Twining argues that jurisprudence has "centrifugal tendencies" in the sense 
that jurists have a proclivity to inquire into and draw upon the insights of other 
intellectual disciplines and environments. In this light, the role of the jurist is to 
serve as a bridge between law and something else. In my opinion, such a 
function can be fulfilled in one of two ways: jurisprudence as assimilation and 
jurisprudence as an interpretive grid. Twining himself seems only to recognize 
the first. 
In terms of the assimilationist approach, Twining argues that the role of the 
jurist is to "venture forth ... [and] bring back the ideas, techniques, and insights 
of [another] discipline and to integrate or assimilate them into the intellectual 
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upon strong assumptions as to the nature and parameters of law. In that sense it 
tends to presume that law itself is unproblematic. Moreover, it constructs 
jurisprudence as an active subject and other intellectual genres as passive 
objects, waiting to be press-ganged into the service of legal theory. Such an 
assumption has resulted in the familiar paradigm of "law and . .. " approaches, 
with corresponding charges of intellectual imperialism (and na'ivete). 
The interpretive grid approach is somewhat more self-reflective and modest 
in its ambitions. It recognizes that legal theory is a form of intellectual practice, 
but one that may be potentially enriched through an egalitarian engagement with 
other intellectual disciplines. In this approach, jurisprudence is understood as a 
framework of analysis that is both latently enlightening and necessarily partial, 
in the sense of incomplete. Within this approach, law itself is recognized to be 
a problematic category of analysis that is up for grabs. The agenda in this 
approach is not one of the assimilation of other disciplines, but constructive, if 
mutually critical, explorations. 
There appears to be ample evidence of this interdisciplinary turn in Charter 
jurisprudence.38 References to, and adaptations of, anthropology, economics, 
literary criticism, philosophy, political theory, rhetoric, semiotics, sociology, 
social theory, and even social psychology and psychoanalysis are rampant. 
Indeed, it almost seems de rigueur to at least footnote some non-legal thinker or 
tradition whose insights lay the foundation for what the Charter jurist has to 
offer. 
Moreover, I would suggest that, as Charter-oriented jurisprudence has 
sought out interlocutors over the last decade or so, there has been a shift from 
philosophy - particularly in its positivistic and analytical mode - to social 
theory - particularly in its progressive modes. 39 In other words, the focus is not 
38 
39 
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so much on the question "what is law?" but more on the question, "what is to be 
done with, or about, law?" This transition is particularly apparent in the work of 
jurists like J.C. Smith who have shifted from a heavy focus on analytical 
positivism40 to "postmodern psychoanalytic theory" with a heavy Freudian 
bent,41 or Bill Conklin with his Derridean inspired "image of a constitution" 
theory.42 
Also of considerable significance is the turn, sometimes implicit but often 
explicit, to literary criticism. Many scholars, who emanate from divers� and 
often quite contradictory ideological positions, seem to be inspired by their 
inquiries into the different approaches to literary criticism. However, despite 
these differences, there appears to be widespread consensus that the way to 
proceed in a Charter-ized regime is through a colloquy,43 democratic dialogue,44 
a postmodern democratic dialogue,45 a distinctively Canadian conversation,46 
communicative discourse,47 constitutional dialogue of democratic account­
ability,48 a conversation of justification,49 a conversation about rights and roles.50 
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have more to say about this apparent faith in dialogism later in the essay, but at 
this point I simply want to highlight that almost everyone seems to be doing it. 
Moreover, while I clearly believe that the interdisciplinary tum of recent 
jurisprudence is an undoubted plus, there is of course the ever-present danger of 
dilettantism: the superficial and uncritical borrowing of concepts, interpretive 
strategies and methods from other disciplines without sufficient familiarity of the 
internal debates or an adequate appreciation as to their pedigree within their own 
discipline. Bix, for example, has been very critical of Langille's "misapplication" 
and "flouting" of Wittgenstinian ideas.5 1  
C. The Construction of High Theory 
i) High Theory Defined 
For Twining, "high theory" is essentially "philosophical," it addresses 
"fundamental issues," which might include:52 
[ v ]ery general questions about the nature and functions of law, the concept of a legal 
system, the relationship between law and morality, the differences between law and other 
types of social control, perennial questions about justice, and ultimate questions about the 
epistemological and other fundamental assumptions of legal discourse .... 
Closely connected with the idea of high theory is what, in some circles, is called 
conceptualism. Conceptualism is an approach to jurisprudence which, rather than 
· considering the law in action, tends to draw on the insights of analytic 
philosophy to posit that it is most appropriate to think of law as if it were a 
system of ideas or concepts each of which is in need of elucidation. Key 
categories of conceptual analysis might include inter alia: right, good, duty, 
command, sanction, validity, rule, principle, authority, legitimacy, and 
obligation. 
Dovetailing with both high theory and conceptualism is an implicit 
depoliticization of law. While this is a point I will address in more detail later, 
I want to suggest that the philosophical abstraction of high theory, coupled with 
the disengagement from social issues engendered by conceptualism, tends to 
portray law and legal thinking as somehow autonomous and distinct from the 
5 1  
52 
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political messiness of law in action. 53 Thus, it is suggested that high theory ( or 
philosophy) is a method of jurisprudence but, unlike legal theory, it is not 
coterminous with jurisprudence.54 
Quite a lot of Canadian legal theory operates in the tradition of high theory, 
particularly in the pages of the Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence. 55 At 
first blush it would seem that, in the main, the Charter has had little impact in 
this sphere except for a passing question as to the pedigree of the Constitution 
Act 1 982 in relation to the "rule of recognition."56 But there are perhaps two 
exceptions to this suggestion which may have quite a large impact :  the post­
rationalist turn in jurisprudence and the rights debate. 
ii) The Post-Rationalist Turn 
The first exception to the proposition that the Charter has not had a great 
deal of influence on the practice of high legal theory might be described as the 
"post-rationalist" turn in Canadian legal thinking. Historically, most legal 
thought has tended to conceive of the rule of law as "an unqualified human 
good,"57 as an instrumentality for cogently identifying and resolving societal 
problems. For many, the Charter is but another confirmation of law's capacity 
to do the right thing, this time by delineating the scope of human rights in 
Canada _and the limited circumstances in which they may be thwarted.58 
Perhaps the grandest assault on this rational instrumentalist conception of 
law comes from J.C. Smith and his argument that our legal order may, in fact, 
be driven by a neurotic patriarchal psyche, a juridical unconscious that is 
motored by an irrational fear of the other.59 Smith, however, has little to say 
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judges can interpret it in a "different voice" that is more open to diverse needs 
of a postmodern society such as Canada. 60 
Bill Conklin is less psychoanalytic in his orientation. He urges us to focus 
less on the unconscious and more on the conscious images of a constitution that 
construct and curtail legal praxis. In the tradition of postmodern epistemology, 
Conklin has identified the limits of the various rationalistic strategies - rule 
rationalism, policy rationalism, and orthodox rationalism - adopted by lawyers 
and judges over the years to neutralize and depoliticize their decision-making. 
Rationalism in the service of legal thought has been conceived of as mere 
instrumental technique. Through a review of Charter case law at both the 
Supreme Court and (unusually for most jurists) at the lower levels he identifies 
the perpetuation of such rationalistic legitimation strategies. 
In their place, drawing on the scholarship and judgments of Rand J., he calls 
for a more "teleological" commitment to decision-making. This mode of legal 
reasoning makes explicit one's conception of the good, one's understanding of 
social interaction and, most importantly for Conklin, one's theory of the 
person:61 
The challenge for the contemporary lawyer is to picture a constitution which allows 
him/her to question the "givens," to connect the "givens" universalist human rights claims 
of theory, and to critique their reified character when divorced from social/cultural 
practice.62 
· · 
· By unpacking such presuppositions Conklin aspires to make legal decision­
makers subject to the demands of what he, in contrast to instrumental reason, 
calls "critical reason."63 Critical reason insists that one must develop the talent 
of self-reflexivity, that one must resist juridical closure and that one must make 
explicit one's prejudgments, be they ontological, political or moral. Furthermore, 
Conklin argues that the Charter, because of the centrality of the manifestly 
contestable concepts of freedom, democracy, liberty, and equality, necessarily 
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In other words, legal decision-makers must justify their reasons and, therefore, 
be held accountable for the enforcement of their preferred image of the 
constitution. In this way, Conklin argues, the nexus between (legal) knowledge 
and power is rendered transparent and, thereby, more contestable. 65 
Turpel is even more poignant in her challenge to the assumed beneficence 
and rationalism of the Charter. Again drawing on the insights of post-analytic 
philosophy (this time from a First Nations perspective) she argues that the 
Charter has little to do with "the good." Rather, it is a symbol and practice of 
cultural and juridical imperialism through which the dominant Canadian culture 
continues its colonization of First Nations people who have very different 
conceptions of social relations and legal norms. 66 
iii) The Rights Debate 
The second exception where there does appear to be a connection between 
high theory and the Charter relates to "rights." Two quite distinct questions are 
pertinent. First, there is the debate between those who believe in the utility of a 
rights discourse, those who do not, and those who resist dichotomous analyses.67 
Secondly, there is the question of whether there can be such a thing as collective 
rights or group rights. 
The dominant intellectual paradigm in Canadian jurisprudence presumes that 
rights, like law, are both natural and unequivocally desirable. Drawing on the 
spectre of an unfettered majoritarianism advocates of an entrenched Charter 
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given to the right to individual liberty.69 Viewed from this perspective, the 
juridical history of Canada is one of inexorable (if slow) improvement as we 
have moved from a shaky common law regime of inchoate rights, to the statutory 
recognition of rights, to the constitutional entrenchment of rights.70 Jurists who 
subscribe to such a perspective envision the Charter as a normative and 
institutional structure designed to encourage both the courts and the legislators 
to maximize human rights71 and social justice. 72 However, if there is conflict 
between the legislatures and the courts, most rights advocates tend to argue that 
the courts should have the last word not only because they are likely to be the 
strongest guardians of minority interests,73 but also because the Charter itself 
provides objective and determinative right answers.74 Importantly, many rights 
theorists emphasize that the judicial enforcement of rights is grounded in 
principle, not policy, politics or power.75 The call is for "judicial 
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Others, however, are unimpressed and advance several arguments against the 
ideology and practice of the Charter-ization of rights.78 First, critics argue that 
judicial review is undemocratic because judges are unelected and, therefore, · 
unaccountable.79 Moreover, they are said to be unreflective of the class, race, 
gender, ( dis )abilities, sexual orientations or political preferences of Canadian 
society-at-large.80 Particular attention has been focused on the hostility of the 
courts to rights claims by unions as manifested in Dolphin Delivery81 and the 
right to secondary picket, the Labour Trilogy82 as to whether the freedom to 
associate includes a right to strike, and the BCGEu83 case in which the right to 
picket, though recognized as a form of expression under section 2(b) could be 
justifiably restricted under section 1 .84 Inversely, the courts are identified as 
having a pro-business tendency in, for example, their somewhat formalistic and 
legalistic recognition of corporations as persons and the correlative entitlement 
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Second, and closely related, is the argument that a public preoccupation with 
a Charter and rights arguments tends to subordinate and colonize other forms of 
political debate and mobilization. Such a dynamic priorizes litigation rather than 
participation,86 and reconstructs "citizens" as "petitioners." 1his is com­
pounded by the danger that litigational politics tends to catapult lawyers into the 
position of a �olitical vanguard, a vanguard that is disconnected from broader 
social causes. 8 
Third, Charter politics are accused of being elitist in that only the 
institutionally well positioned or the affluent can afford to utilize the courts89 -
the Lavigne90 case is said to have cost the unions about $400,00091 and rumour 
has it that LEAF may have spent up to $ 1  million on Andrews.91 
Fourth, it is argued that in both form and structure the Charter advances 
individualism, consolidates essential capitalist legal relations and undercuts 
solidarity and collectivism in that it favours freedom of the individual from state 
intervention when a caring society requires such state intervention to equalize 
and redistribute social goods.93 Former Chief Justice Dickson's liberal 









L. J. 309. 
Bogart, supra note 22 at c. 1 ;  J. Fudge, "The Effect of Entrenching a Bill of Rights 
upon Political Discourse: Feminist Demands and Sexual Violence in Canada" (1989) 
17 Int. J. Soc. L. 445 ; Monahan, supra note 22 at 138; J. Webber, "Tales of the 
Unexpected: Intended and Unintended Consequences of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms" (1993) 5 Canterbury L. Rev. 207 at 221-25. 
Hutchinson, supra note 22 at 122; Mandel, supra note 8 at xi-xii. But see Talking 
Heads and the Supremes, supra note 22 at 147-48. 
Conklin, supra note 65; S. Razack, Canadian Feminism and the Law: The Women's 
Legal Education and Action Fund and the Pursuit of Equality (Toronto: Second Story 
Press, 1991) at 52-58. 
G. Brodsky & S. Day, Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step 
Forward or Two Steps Back? (Ottawa: CACSW, 1989). 
Lavigne v. OPSEU, (1991] 2 S.C.R. 21 1 .  
I. Greene, The Charter of Rights (Toronto: J .  Lorimer, 1989) a t  62-63. 
Andrews v. Law Society (British Columbia) ( 1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.). 
L. Apland & C. Axworthy, "Collective and Individual Rights in Canada: A Perspective 
on Democratically Controlled Organizations" ( 1988) 8 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 44; 
Bogart, supra note 22 at 125; Brodsky & Day, supra note 89; R. Cairns Way, "The 
Charter, The Supreme Court and the Invisible Politics of Fault" ( I  992) 12 Windsor 
Y.B. Access Just 128; J. Fudge, "What Do We Mean by Law and Social 
Transformation?" ( 1990) 5 Can. J. Law. & Soc. 47 at 57; Hutchinson, supra note 22 at 
c. 4; Monahan, supra note 22, c. 5-6; A. Petter, "Immaculate Deception: The Charter's 
Hidden Agenda" (1987) 45(6) Advocate 857; Webber, supra note 86 at 218-21. 
Vol. IV, No. 1 
Review of Constitutional Studies 
The Charter and Anglophone Legal Theory 39 
Southam,94 Big M Drug Mart95 and Oakes96 often are targeted here.97 Similarly, 
there has been much criticism of the Supreme Court's confirmation of the 
National Citizens Coalition argument that limitations on third party spending 
violated section 2(b) of the Charter because the effect was to enhance the 
amount of money that the corporate elite was able to donate to the federal 
Progressive Conservative party during the Free Trade election of 1984.98 
Fifth, it is argued that the courts are an inappropriate forum for social policy 
making because: a) judges are unequipped to deal with large scale social issues; 
b) the exceptionalism and specificity of individual cases unduly decontextualizes 
the complexity of the issues;99 and c) when legalized, all public social problems 
tend to be re-encoded and repackaged as issues of private individual rights which 
can only generate zero-sum solutions. 100 Again, labour relations are frequently 
cited. 
Sixth, due to their abstraction, rights discourse and legal reasoning are 
identified as deeply indeterminate and, therefore, capable of diverse 
interpretations, depending on the ideological preferences of the interpreters 
(judges) and the contexts in which such interpretations are invoked. 101 Moreover, 
there is the problem of causal indeterminacy; that is, the long term and broader 
social impact of a partirular decision or set of decisions can be extremely 
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any concrete social impact and, indeed, may even operate as a form of 
deradicalization through partial incorporation. 103 
Finally, at least one critic worries that Charter-ized rights can encourage a 
unidimensional and stultifying nationalism. 104 
Dichotomies rarely capture the full panorama of perspectives, 105 and this is 
as true of jurisprudentology as it is of any other form of analysis. Thus, it can be 
suggested that as distinct from the faithful and the skeptics there may be a third 
category of jurists who, very roughly, might be described as the "progressive 
deviationists."106 They are united in a couple of beliefs. First, deviationists accept 
that, for better or worse, judicial review is a constitutional fact and that it is, 
therefore, essential to focus on what can best be done with this reconfiguration 
of social institutions. Second, they argue that rights have no inherent or essential 
meaning; rather, they are social constructs that have been imagined and given 
concrete form at certain historical conjunctures and, therefore, they are capable 
of being remade in the contemporary historical moment. Third, given this 
plasticity, rights can be reconceptualized, reinterpreted and rearticulated not 
solely as exclusive fences to protect the individual but also as relational and 
communitarian interests that entitle citizens to pursue social goods. Fourth, 
deviationists argue that such an open-ended vision of rights can allow for 
significant differential treatment and an expansive pluralist tolerance in 
constructing social, legal, and constitutional policies. Fifth, this pursuit of 
difference can be most effectively achieved if citizens and judges conceive of 
• rights claims as part of an ongoing mutually empathetic. social conversation. 
Unity can be grounded in the accommodation of difference. Sixth, at the level 
of strategy, deviationists argue: a) that negative rights are extremely valuable for 
those who are still the victims of discrimination; b) that rights generally can 
serve as a medium of personal valorization; c) that rights discourse can serve as 
a potent form of ( counterhegemonic) consciousness-raising, resistance and 
mobilization and, therefore, it cannot be abandoned as a potential political 
platform; and d) that the achievement of a rights claim can send an important 
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probably the most explicit spokespersons for this perspective, 107 but I would 
suggest that it also informs the legal philosophy of many feminists, 108 self­
described egalitarian liberals, 109 and some post-liberals. 1 10 
The debate between rights advocates, critics, and progressive deviationists 
continues unabated and, as we shall see, underpins several other forms of 
jurisprudential analysis. However, before addressing these issues there is a 
second aspect of the rights debate that is pertinent to the realm of high theory: 
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Specifically, section 1 5  (the equality provisions), sections 16-23 (language 
rights), section 25 (aboriginal rights), section 27 (multiculturalism) and section 
28 (women's rights) have been hotly contested Charter provisions. So too have 
been proposals for a Social Charter. While some argue that group rights are 
nonsensical because a group is indeterminate, 111 others point to the needs of 
native,112 multicultural, 113 and minority language 114communities to argue that 
collective rights are both defensible and that they fulfill an important 
constitutional function. Problematized by cases such as Societe des Acadiens, 115 
Ford v. Quebec (A. -G.) 1 16 and Sparrow, 117 as well as the draft legal text of the 
Charlottetown Accord, many legal philosophers provide us with a steady, and 
sometimes sustaining, diet of conceptual distinctions that operate at various 
levels of description and abstraction: individualism and communitarianism; 118 
liberalism and communitarianism; 119 history-based groupism and liberal 
individualism; 120 hostile liberalism, moderately sceptical liberalism and 
sympathetic liberalism; 121 duality and multiculturalism; 122 multiculturalism, 
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